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Reflections on Hans Micklitz’ Plea For
a ‘Movable System’ (of Consumer Law):
Something to Learn from the Experiences 
of Indian Consumer Law
Prof. Dr. H.C. Norbert Reich*
Abstract
The topic of the paper is based on a study done for GIZ, the German
developmental agency concerning the improvement of consumer protection in India
by the combined use of preventive and remedial justice which is possible under the
Indian Consumer Protection Act (CPA) but not adequately implemented. The paper
takes as a starting point Hans Micklitz’ concept of a “movable system of consumer
law”, developed in the EU context whereby remedies under unfair commercial
practices and unfair contract terms legislation should be applied in combination
and not be separated into different “legal boxes” each following its own logic.
The consequences of such an approach for rethinking Indian consumer law are
presented with some reform proposals to be undertaken by the Indian legislator.

A Personal Dedication

Writing a paper in the Liber amicorum of Hans Micklitz is an honour,
but at the same time a difficult challenge. An honour: this allows me to
participate actively in the broad appreciation which the rich and diversified
academic work of Hans Micklitz has found and which will be witnessed
by the many contributions in this Liber amicorum. A challenge in so far
as perhaps none of the authors have worked so closely with Hans Micklitz
over time: beginning with our joint project “Consumer Legislation in
the EC Countries”, published from 1979-1981 in the form of a summary
in three languages (English, German, French) and national reports of the
then 9 EEC countries with a team of 9 national reporters - a specific EEC/
EC/EU consumer law was only in its starting phase; the next “big project”
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was the joint treatise “Europäisches Verbraucherrecht”, 4th edition 2003,
complemented by an English version (with Peter Rott participating) as
“Understanding EU Consumer Law” in 2009, the second edition (with
Klaus Tonner joining the party!) foreseen to be published in the beginning
of 2014; in between and thereafter a number of papers in German and
English – too many to be listed here, and some coming out soon. Is there
anything new to add to this research cooperation? How can I surprise my
longtime colleague and friend with a topic unknown to him?
The topic I choose has something to do with a project monitored by
the highly respected transnational advisory work of Hans Micklitz. It has
as its subject matter a review of the Indian consumer legislation recently
supported by GIZ, the German development agency active in India, and
where I had a chance to participate as one of these “short-term experts”. I
was assigned to a topic where Hans Micklitz would have been a much more
qualified expert, namely improvement of collective remedies against Unfair
Trade Practices where the EU-Unfair Commercial Practices Directive
2005/29 of 11 May 2005 (the UCPD)1 stands out as model which has been
commented by Hans Micklitz several times. But it’s Art. 3 (2) seemingly
precludes any relevance for contract law. This strict separation between
unfair trade practices law and contract law has found the critique of Hans
Micklitz many times and stands in contrast to his plea for a “movable system
of consumer law”.2 Is there something to learn from Indian law?
1
2

Directive 2005/29/EC of the EP and the Council of 11 May 2005 on Unfair Commercial
Practices, OJ EU L 149/22.
Hans-W.Micklitz, Brauchen Konsumenten und Unternehmen eine neue Architektur des
Verbraucherrechts, Gutachten A zum 69 Deutschen Juristentag, München 2012; English
translation as: Do Consumer and Businesses Need a New Architecture of Consumer
Law? A Thought Provoking Impulse, Yearbook European Law, Oxford 2011, 266 at
pp. 349.
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The CPA of 1986 as Amended in 2002: An Original and
Innovative Yet Deficient Consumer Protection
Instrument in an Emerging Economy
2.1. 	The Importance of the UN-Guidelines on Consumer Protection of
11 April 1985

The Indian Consumer Protection Act of 1986 (in the following: CPA)
must be seen as an expression of the growing importance of the consumer
protection movement worldwide at the time of its adoption. According to a
remark by Nayak written shortly after the adoption of the CPA, “(I)n India,
consumerism is yet to become a people’s movement… The Act is a positive
step towards achieving this.”3
The most important document of the time had been the UN Guidelines
for Consumer Protection which found a sympathetic assessment in a paper
by our unfortunately now deceased friend David Harland.4 The Guidelines
– which had no binding legal force and were addressed to UN members –
contained seven areas for further action. In the context of this study, two
sets of Guidelines are of interest:

3
4
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•

Promotion and protection of consumers’ economic interests (paras
13-23): promotional marketing and sales practices should be guided
by the principles of “fair treatment of consumers”; misleading
marketing practices should be banned, information for consumers
improved.5

•

Measures enabling consumers to obtain redress (paras 28-30):
this stresses the importance of access to law, implying that access
to the normal courts is not a realistic option for most consumers.
“Accordingly, Governments should establish or maintain legal
and/or administrative measures to enable consumers or, where

Nayak, Consumer Protection Act 1986: Law and Policy in India, JCP 1987, 417 at p.
423.
Harland, the UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection, JCP 1987, 245-266.
Harland, pp. 253-254.
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appropriate relevant organizations to obtain redress through formal
or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, inexpensive, and
accessible.”6
2.2. The Most Important Innovation of the CPA: The Establishment of
a

Three-Tier Special Jurisdiction for Consumer Affairs in India

The main focus of the CPA was the establishment of a parallel system
of resolving consumer complaints outside the regular court system. This
is quite a radical move but follows clearly the “philosophy” of the UN
Guidelines. It is also the result of a widespread critique of the functioning
of the judicial system in India which was said to deny access to law
to “normal”, in particular poor consumers. Incremental reforms like
undertaken in many other common law jurisdictions were regarded as
insufficient. The CPA therefore established a completely new quasi-judicial
system, consisting of three tiers:
•

District Consumer Redressal Fora to handle local and regional
complaints, 629 for all India

•

35 State Commissions as a sort of appeal instance against orders of
the District Fora, one to be established in every State, with special
jurisdiction in cases exceeding 20 “lakhs” (2.000.000 Rs = ca.
24.000 €)

•

One National Commission residing in New Delhi, competent to
hear appeals against orders of the States’ Commissions resp. in
complaints exceeding 1 “crore” (10.000.000 Rp. = ca. 120.000 €)

•

The Indian Supreme Court has final jurisdiction in appeals against
orders of the National Commission.

2.3. Extending the Standing Provisions

Another important innovation of the CPA was the broadening of standing
provisions, thus following an earlier “revolutionary” case law of the Indian
6

Harland, p. 256.
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Supreme Court.7 The starting point was rather simple and followed both
Constitutional and International requirements: In many cases the individual
consumer who is harmed by an unfair practice will not be able or willing to
take action by himself/herself. Individual remedies may also be insufficient
to eliminate the total harm to a larger consumer population. Following
earlier precedents of the Supreme Court which were not limited to consumer
matters,jurisdiction was therefore extended in Art. 12 CPA.
•

Standing of “recognized consumer associations”: Sec. 12 (b) CPA;
registration is necessary

•

Group actions of “numerous consumers having the same interest”:
Sec. 12 (c) which is broadly interpreted by Supreme Court and
allows an Indian variant of “class action”.8

•

Standing of central or state governments does not seem to play a
great role.

•

Traders and/or trade associations don’t have standing, unlike Art.
11 (1) of the UCPD.

2.4. Deficits with Regard to Preventive Remedies

The CPA was concerned with establishing a country wide redressal
system in order to overcome the malfunctioning of the existing common
law instruments and jurisdictions which did not meet the social and
consumer concerns of their time in India. Prevention was therefore not
really part of the CPA in its original version. Remedies and procedures
under Sec. 14 CPA were mostly focused on compensation and/or restitution
to give the “ordinary” Indian consumer who had been defrauded on the
market back what was owed to him, or to compensate him/her for wrongs
suffered by unfair marketing practices, including some modest interest
7
8

Singh, Group Actions and the Law: A Case Study of Social Action Litigation and
Consumer Protection, JCP 1995, 25-54.
This important innovation of Indian consumer law is used by NLSIU/Bengaluru students,
after having bought the falsely advertised products, to file public interest law suits
alleging UTP; See Patil, March of Consumer Law and Practice, NLSIU, 2012, Vol. V,
Issue No. 2, p. 7.
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payment. Of course, these remedies could indirectly have a preventive and
even a deterrent effect, e.g. by cumulating compensation in the form of
group actions under Sec. 12 (c) CPA, but they were limited to an “opt-in”
mechanism, unlike the US-American opt-out version of the class action.
Some remedies could be used for prevention provided that adequate
procedures existed, as will be shown later (IV. 5.); they could and should
be extended, as will be shown in the recommendations under V.
A later section of this paper will inquire in how far the CPA really
attained this compensatory objective – an objective which many observers
have cast into doubt. First I want to turn to the preventive function of
trade practices regulation in India which developed outside the CPA by
the special jurisdiction of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade PracticesCommission(MRTP-C).
The Impact of the MRTP-Commission (MRTP-C) on UTP
Regulation in India
3.1. Establishment, Functioning and Winding-up of the MRTP-C

The MRTP-C was originally established in 1969 with a jurisdiction
limited to the classical area of monopolies and restrictive trade practices.
Its jurisdiction was extended in 1984 to also cover Unfair Trade Practices
(UTP) – a development well documented in a recent study by Prof. Mittal
et al.9 which I will follow closely.
The 1984 amendments to the MRTP-Act were inspired by the USFederal Trade Commission Act,10 thus going beyond the traditional approach
of competition law by including a regulation of misleading advertising
Mittal (and research associates), A Report on the Experiences of the MRPC 1969, visà-vis enforcement of Unfair Trade Practices in India, unpub., Study of 2013.
10 For an earlier account, See Reich,Staatliche RegulierungzwischenMarktversagen und
Politikversagen — Erfahrungenmit der amerikanischen Federal Trade Commission
und ihreBedeutungfür das Verbraucherschutzrecht,1984; Reich,The US-American
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – A Model for Effective Consumer Protection in a
Unifying European market? In: H.-W. Micklitz/Jürgen Keßler (eds.), Marketing Practices
Regulation and Consumer Protection in the EC Member States and the US, 2002, 417444.
9
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and other unfair marketing practices as the central elements of an UTP.
The object of the legislation was “…only to bring honesty and truth in
the relationship between the seller and the customer”.11 A new Sec. 36
A contained a detailed definition of UTPs which “means a trade practice
which, for the purpose of promoting the sale, use or supply of any goods
or the provision of any services, adopts any unfair method or unfair or
deceptive practice, including any of the following, namely….”
Sec. 36 A then lists in great detail a number of such practices which
all contain an element of deception in order to make law application and
implementation easier. The blacklisted practices relate i.e.
(1) the practice of making any statement, whether orally or in writing or
by visible representation which
(i)

Falsely represents that the goods are of a particular standard,
quality, quantity, grade, composition, style or model;

(ii)

Falsely represents that the services are of a particular standard,
quality or grade;

(iii)

Falsely represents any re-built, second-hand, renovated,
reconditioned or old goods as new goods

(iv)

Represents that the goods or service have sponsorship, approval,
performance, characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits which
such goods or services do not have

(v)

Represents that the seller or supplier has a sponsorship or
approval or affiliation which such seller or supplier does not
have;

(vi)

Makes a false or misleading representation concerning the need
for, or the usefulness of, any goods or services

(vii)

Gives to the public any warranty or guarantee of the
performance, efficacy or length of life of a product or of any
goods that it is not based on an adequate or proper test thereof:

11 Mittal at p. 5.
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Provided that where a defence is raised to the effect that such
warranty or guarantee is based on adequate or proper test, the
burden of proof of such defence shall lie on the person raising
such defence;
(viii) Makes to the public a representation in a form that purports to
be
(i) A warranty or guarantee of a product or of any goods or
services;
(ii) A promise to replace, maintain or repair an article or any
part thereof or repeat or continue a service until it has
achieved a specific result,
If such purposed warranty or guarantee or promise is materially
misleading or if there is a no reasonable prospect that such
warranty, guarantee or promise will be carried out;
(ix)

(misleading price claims)

(x)

… (disparaging goods, services or trade of another person)

Explanation: For the purposes of clause (1), a statement that is –
a. Expressed on an article offered or displayed for sales, or
on its wrapper or container;
b. Expressed on anything attached to, or inserted in, or accompanying, an article offered or displayed for sale, or on
anything on which the article is mounted for display; or
c. Contained in or on anything that is sold, send, delivered,
transmitted or in any other manner whatsoever made available to a member of the public,
Shall be deemed to be a statement made to the public by, and only
by, the person who had caused the statement to be so expressed or
contained;
(2) (Newspaper advertising)
(3) Permits (a)

The offering of gifts, prizes or other items with the intention of
not providing them as offered or creating the impression that
something is being given or offered free of charge when it is
8

fully or partly covered by the amount charged in the transaction
as a whole;
(b)

The conduct of any test, lottery, game of chance or skill, for
the purpose of promoting, directly or indirectly, the sale, use
or supply or any product or any business interest..

(4) (Non-conformity with standards to prevent risk or injury to persons)
(5) (Hoarding of goods with the intention to raise costs).
The Indian Supreme Court, in several judgments held that the definition
was not exhaustive and could be extended to practices not specifically
blacklisted in Sec. 36 A12.
3.2. Scope of UTP under the MRTP-Act and Commission Practice

The Mittal study gives a detailed account of the practice of the MRTP-C
in applying the concept of UTP to different commercial practices in India. As
an important element to extend the scope of the Act the original requirement
to prove loss or damage to the consumer of goods or services was removed
in 1991. This would allow preventive measures of the MRTP-C before harm
to the consumer had occurred. Hence, about 30 % of the complaints filed to
the Commission concerned practices before a contract was concluded – a
striking difference to the practice under the CPA to which we will turn later.13
During its lifetime – the MRTP-C was wound up in 2009 – it handled 719
complaints leading to a number of orders enjoining businesses or advertisers
to stop or to discontinue the incriminated UTP. This appears to be a relatively
small number concerning the time span and the geographical size of its
jurisdiction, but it seems that a substantial deterrent and preventive effect
accompanied its jurisdiction which was highly respected by traders.The total
number of cases decided by MRTP Commission that the Mittal-study has
included in its database and that have been analyzed are 719; however, there
is an increase in the total number of cases in some categories of this analysis
because of the presence of one or more elements which has necessitated in
12 See the references to the Indian Supreme Court case law with Mittal at p. 9
13 Mittal at p. 23.
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repeat counting of that particular case. For example, when one is looking
at the breakup of total number of cases where different reliefs have been
granted by the Commission, one has to add up all the cases in which relief
has been granted. In some cases multiple reliefs have been granted by
the Commission, so the figure of total cases is bound to exceed 719. This
method of statistical analysis will have minimal effect on the calculated
percentages and will be a more accurate portrayal of the data.
The work of the MRTP-C was also quite successful on (rare) appeal
before the Supreme Court.
3.3. Specific Procedural Rules under the MRTP-Act

During the time of its existence, the MRTP-C enjoyed a relatively
efficient and speedy mechanism of regulating UTPs, in particular misleading
advertising. Not only consumers or consumer associations and groups
but also traders and trade associations could file a complaint with the
Commission – unlike under the CPA. The Commission could also start an
investigation suo motu.14
If the Commission found that a certain advertising contained an UTP,
it could adopt a cease-and-desist order. If the public interest required it, it
could issue a temporary injunction which included the power to grant it
without giving notice to the opposite party.15 Under Sec. 36 D (1) (c) it also
could take an order for corrective advertisement – a remedy used rather
seldom.16 Finally, Sec. 12B gave the MRTP-C power to order compensation.
In cases of violation of a Commission order, a punishment for contempt
could be imposed. The statistics of Mittal17 demonstrate the following
distribution of remedies for relief:

14
15
16
17

Mittal at p. 26.
Mittal at pp. 28, 33.
Mittal at p. 32.
At p. 36.
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Nature of relief

Cases UTP

Percentage

Injunctive relief

47

6, 46%

Compensation

174

23, 90 %

Order to discontinue the practice

99

13, 60 %

Order for republication of correct- 2
ed advertisement

0, 27 %

Punishment for contempt

1

0, 14 %

No relief

405

55, 63 5

Total

728

100 %

The great number of cases without any formal remedy seems to suggest a
high success rate of the MRTP-C, despite the overall rather limited number
of complaints and follow-up decisions.
In the opinion of Mittal, the “success and efficiency of the MRTP system
is a function of types of UTPs covered, variety of industries pursued, ease
with which different stakeholders could approach the forum, time taken for
disposal of disputes, satisfaction of the litigant, number of complaints in
which relief was granted along with the variety of reliefs granted.”.18 This
success story did not prevent the MRTP-Commission from being abolished
during the 2002 reform which separated as before 1984 the regulation
of restrictive practice which was transferred to a newly established
Competition Commission, and the regulation of UTP which was transferred
to the CPA-structure – a transfer the consequences of which I will discuss in
the following section with its impact on the preventive combat against UTP.
The CPA as amended in 2002 – a Hybrid Regulator of UTP
4.1. The Half-Hearted Transfer of powers of the MRTP-C to the CPA
Three-Tier Structure
18 At p. 44.
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When the 2002 amendments of the Trade Practices Regulation provided
for the abolition of the MRTP-C, the Indian legislator had to decide if and as the case may be - who would take over jurisdiction of the regulating UTP.
The result was a somewhat strange and for the foreign observer difficult
to understand compromise:
•

Restrictive practices jurisdiction was transferred to a newly created
Competition Commission

•

Substantive UTP jurisdiction was completely put into the hands of
the CPA-structure

•

The special powers of the MRTP-C were however not transferred
to the CPA-institutions.

As a result, the CPA-institutions were left as the only ones to combat
UTP on the Indian market, but did not get any additional powers to do so in
a similar preventive spirit which were specific to the soon to be dissolved
MRTP-C. This led to a somewhat “hybrid”, rather contradictory structure
of the CPA:
•

On the one hand, Sec. 2(1)(r) as amended lists a number of UTPs,
nearly identical to the substantive provisions of the MRTP Act of
1969 as amended by Sec. 36 (A) in 1984.19

•

On the other hand, the procedural provisions on implementation
were however not taken over into the CPA, e.g. standing of traders
and trade associations to take complaints before the District Fora
resp. State Commissions, their investigation powers suo motu, broad
jurisdiction allowing injunctive relief and temporary injunctions,
enforcement of their orders via a contempt of court procedure.

The most important difference between the jurisdiction of the MRTP-C
and the CPA-three tier structure lies in the fact that the first was a centralized
19 Mittal, in: Henning-Bodewig, (ed.), International Handbook on Unfair Competition
Law, § 14 India Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2013at paras 21-54, 72-79.
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administrative agency, subject to review only by the Supreme Court, while
the CPA-institutions were regarded as quasi-judicial bodies which could not
take action on their own and which were submitted to a pyramidal appeal
structure culminating in a final appeal of orders of the National Commission
before the Supreme Court. It is obvious that proceedings before or initiated
by the MRTP-C could be handled much more efficiently and rapidly than
complaints concerning UTP within the three-tier structure of the CPA.
4.2. The Compensation Paradigm of the CPA-Mechanism under its UTP
Jurisdiction

Even though the concepts of UTP under the former MRTP-Act and
under the CPA as amended are substantially identical due to the transfer
of jurisdiction in 2002, the models of enforcement are completely
different. While the MRTP-Act was concerned with prevention, the CPA
aims primarily at (fair and speedy?) compensation of wrongs suffered or
restitution of undue payments entered into by consumers due to – not only
but specifically - an UTP of a business, trader, or advertiser. This can be
demonstrated by reference to the basic concept of the CPA, namely the
conditions of a successful complaint:Jurisdiction of the District Fora is
limited under Sec. 12 (1) in relation to “any goods sold or delivered or
agreed to be sold or delivered or any service provided or agreed to be
provided…” This definition does not cover the pre-contractual phase of an
UTP, unlike the repealed MRTP-Act and Article 3(1) of EU Dir. 2005/29/
EC, which extends the scope of application to “commercial practices before,
during and after a commercial transaction relating to a product (including
services)”. The CPA definition therefore seems not to be appropriate to
combat misleading advertising before a product has been sold or a service
has been provided. It was completely inadequate to take over the “lost”
MRTP-jurisdiction. The same is true with the concept of consumer under
Sec. 2 (d) whereby “consumer” means any person who
(i) buys any goods for a consideration which has been paid or promised
or partly paid and partly promised, or under any system of deferred
13

payment and includes any user of such goods other than the person
who buys such goods for consideration paid or promised or partly
paid or partly promised, or under any system of deferred payment,
when such use is made with the approval of such person, but does
not include a person who obtains such goods for resale
(ii) (Hire-purchase)
Explanation: For the purposes of sub-clause (i), “commercial
purpose does not include use by a consumer of goods bought and
used by him for the purpose of earning his livelihood, by means of
self-employment”.
Again, the difference to the EU concept of consumer is striking as
defined in Art. 2 (a) of the UCPD whereby “‘consumer’ means any natural
person who, in commercial practices covered by this Directive, is acting
for purposes which are outside his trade, business, craft or profession.”
For EU law, the purpose of the action of a person is decisive, while, for
Indian law, the conclusion of a contract for consideration transforms this
person into a consumer, unless the good is purchased for resale, but may
be used for self-employment.
The CPA clearly has the fairness of the individual consumer transactions
in mind in its regulation of UTP. It is oriented towards the protection of the
individual wronged by an UTP, not towards regulating the market against
UTP as was intended by the – later abolished powers – of the MRTP-C.
As the Indian author Verma correctly writes: “Unlike the earlier laws,
which were punitive and preventive in nature, the provisions of the CPA
are compensatory in nature.”20
There has been abundant case law of the CPA institutions concerning
compensation respectively restitution (including discretionary interest
payment and reimbursements of costs of legal proceedings) granted to
consumers injured by UTP of businesses; Sec. 14 (1) (d) requires only
20 Verma, Developments in Consumer Protection in India, JCP 2002, 107 at p. 111.
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“negligence of the opposite party” . Most interesting have been decisions
of the National Commission and rare judgments of the Supreme Court
having status as precedents. Due to the great bulk of cases, it is impossible
to go into details. Most surprisingly to the lawyer trained in traditional
categories of civil law application based on such concepts as contract, tort,
fault, joint and several liability, restitution etc., the mechanism of the CPA
operates outside these concepts, if a link to the injury of the consumer to
an UTP can be shown to exist. This is at odds with Art. 3(2) of the above
mentioned EU Dir. 2005/29 which states explicitly:
This Directive is without prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to
the rules on the validity, formation and effect of a contract.
Such broad jurisdiction, denying a clear demarcation line between
unfair practices on the market as such and specific consumer harm caused
by these practices, avoids on the one hand the legal technicalities to
which compensation of consumers is subjected and frequently limited.
The Consumer Fora enjoy a broad discretion in defining an UTP and in
granting remedies to the injured consumer without the need to go into a
detailed legal analysis under Sec. 14 CPA. The CPA in its 2002 version
has established a parallel regime of consumer law, not only with regard
to procedures but also to substance. This resorting to equitable consumer
justice“beyond the books” is to some extent however “compensated” by
the length of proceedings, especially when the orders of the District Fora
are taken to appeal (infra IV. 4(b).). What is even more surprising is the
appearance of lawyers in most of the consumer complaints, if the anecdotal
evidence given to me is correct.
A more traditional approach has been taken with regard to defective
goods under Sec. 2 (1) (f) and deficient services under Sec. 2 (1) (g)
combined with the remedies under Sec. 14 (1) (a), (b) (c), (e) CPA; special
remedies are foreseen for hazardous products under Sec. 14 (1) (g-h) but
will not be discussed here.
15

4.3. The Main Objective of Litigation under the CPA: Just Compensation

The enormous balk of case law of the Indian Consumer Redressal
Institutions cannot be adequately analysed in the context of this short paper
which is concerned mostly with prevention, not so much compensation.
But in order to understand the “spirit” and objective of the CPA System, it
is useful to look at two areas where a striking difference to EU Traditions
can be found:
•

The submission of medical malpractice cases under the CPA regime.

•

The existence of a compensatory mechanism favouring individual
(or group of) consumers injured by an UTP.

A Short Look at Medical Malpractice Cases under the CPA Provisions on
Deficient Services

Medical malpractice cases, due to a broad definition of the “consumer”
by the Indian Supreme Court,21 have been litigated by the Consumer Fora
under the heading of “deficïent (medical) services”. The following orders of
the National Commission reported in a recent collection22 and also published
in law journals are worth mentioning to give the non-Indian reader an
impression on the complexity and originality of litigation under the CPA.
•

In the case MC Katare V/s Bombay Hospital,23 the litigation
concerned a young woman who loses her life due to medical
negligence by doctors. Anesthesia is incorrectly administered during
ankle operation. Doctors were held liable by National Commission.
Rs 5 lakhs (about 6.000 €) compensation were awarded. The
plaintiffs demanded Rs 25 lakhs as compensation, arguing that the
young woman, of 30 years at the time of death would contribute to

21 For a recent analysis see Auquip Malik and Deepak, Interpretation of Medical Negligence
under the CPA, in: Patil (ed.), 25 Years of Consumer Protection Act – Challenges and
the New Way Forward, 2012, 201-203.
22 Landmark Judgments on Consumer Protection Law, Published by National Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, Universal Law Publishing Company, 2011.
23 At p. 287.
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the family income at Rs 2500 per month, and could be expected to
live for 70 years. The sum of Rs 5 lakhs, awarded after a period
of 15 years (!) does not amount to an adequate compensation. The
UTP giving rise to the complaint is not clear.
•

The litigation Ashok Kumar Upadhyay V/s D.N. Mishra 24 concerned
the death of a child due to medical negligence. A 16 year old boy
dies due to incorrect treatment by doctors. A strain of anti malaria
injection was wrongfully administered causing death of child. The
compensation awarded was Rs 11 lakhs (about 13.000 €) after a
litigation of 13 years. The compensation demanded was Rs 128
lakhs, based on completion of education and earnings in working life
between 24 years and 80 years. The Commission argued that, since
the family was well to do with a permanent source of government
income, did not depend on the son for their survival; hence the
compensation amount was recomputed.

In case Ms Dhanwati Kaur V/s Dr SK Jhunjhunwala,25 the gall bladder
of the patient was removed through surgery without consent. Compensation
claimed was Rs 15 lakhs; the compensation awarded only Rs 2 lakhs (2.500
€), given that the lady was left indisposed and could not attend to household
responsibilities for a period of 9 months.

Compensation linked to UTP
•

Medical malpractice cases may also be litigated under the UTP
jurisdiction which avoids difficult questions of negligence and doctor’s
duties of care and information. A good example is case Ajay Gautman
v Amritsa Eye Clinic and 6/6 Laser Ctr,26 concerning a misleading
advertisement by a doctor that his patients would get rid of spectacles
by undergoing laser surgery. The doctor was found guilty of adopting an
unfair trade practice. He was directed to pay a lump-sum compensation

24 At p. 275.
25 At p. 327.
26 2010 (2) CPR 22 (NC of 26.2.2010).
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of Rs. 100,000 (about 1200 €) and to withdraw the advertisement in
media. He had to give an undertaking before the NC that he will not
publish any such advertisement in the future.
•

The Supreme Court judgment of 5 April 2013 in case Bhanwar Kanwar
v. Gupta et al.27 concerned the deficient treatment of febrile convulsions
during fever at the age of 6 months of the son of the complainant with
the help of advertised Ayurvedic medicine which were passed off as
being Allopathic medicines. The National Commission found that the
doctor was not registered to practice and prescribe modern Allopathic
medicine. He was therefore “guilty of unfair trade practice and adopted
unfair method and deceptive practice by making false statement orally
as well as in writing.” Against the order of the National Commission of
29 January 2009 the Supreme Court awarded an enhanced compensation
for the injury suffered by the child and his father of Rs. 15 lakhs. The
incident and treatment relate to the period of 1994 to 1997.

•

Another series of UTP complaints standing out for their frequency
and impact on consumer’s future chances in the labour market
concern claims on university access or job placement success if a
certain educational training program is contracted; the Patil-study
mentions 11 of them.28 The best known precedent is the Supreme Court
judgment of 13 February 2009 in case Buddhist Mission Dental et al v
BhupeshKruana Camp et al.29 which concerned a misleading claim of a
dental college concerning admission and studies of qualified candidates
for a relatively high fee. The advertisement did not mention that the
college was not recognised by the Dental Council of India and had no
University link. Students had already started enrolling and following
classes only to find out later that their courses and certificates did not
qualify for a professional career. After a protracted litigation against

27 Civil Appeal No. 8660 of 2009, not yet reported.
28 Ashok R. Patil, NLSIU “To study and analyse the cases in the field of misleading and
unfair advertising to explore gaps of the present system of enforcement”, First Draft
Report to GIZ of October 2013 at pp. 5 et seq.
29 (2009)4 Supreme Court Cases p. 484.
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a judgment of the National Commission of 29.9.2000 upon appeal of
the college the Supreme Court awarded Rs. 1 lakh (1200 €) additional
compensation to each of the complaining students and another Rs. 1
lakh for costs of litigation – a rather trifle sum without any deterrent
effect. It seems that twelve students profited from the judgment.
•

The Patil study and the earlier documentation of Singh30 mention a great
number of cases concerning compensation due to UTP of the automobile,
residential homes, financial services, travel and similar industries not
subject to any detailed analysis here. What is striking to the observer
is the little – or even absent - analysis devoted to causation questions
linking the UTP to the specific injury of the consumers. Additionally,
liability seems to be rather strict, requiring only negligence on the
part of the trader or advertiser without the possibility of limiting the
liability via exemption clauses. The competent Consumer Fora and
Commissions seem to enjoy an almost unlimited discretion concerning
sanctions of UTP vis-à-vis individual consumers, including the amount
of compensation to be awarded to the consumer. This makes an analysis
under comparative law aspects almost impossible.

4.4. T wo M ain P roblems

of the

R edressal S ystem : I nsufficient

Compensation & Excessive Length of Proceedings

The Dearth of Compensation
The following overview has been made by my Indian collaborator,
Mr. Gupta concerning in particular the rather discretionary and frequently
unsatisfactory allocation of compensation31:
30 Singh, Law of Consumer Protection in India, 2005, pp. 154.
31 Note by the author Gupta: After analyzing the cases, it can be summarize that the each
forum/commission is awarding damages according to their hierarchy (like Supreme
Court is awarding one lakh) and the particular facts of a case. If the consequence of the
misleading advertisement is grave the compensation is also in the nature of exemplary,
but if not the forum is awarding nominal damages. It’s all depends upon the subjective
satisfaction of the presiding officer of the forum/commission. There is no straitjacket
formula on which we can say the damages should be awarded, though consequential
result of the misleading advertisement may be a guiding factor but it is not the only
way to award damages in a case. The position of the aggrieved consumer, the position
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Sl. Title
No.

Damages + interest+
mental agony in Rs.

1

Big Bazaar vs Government of Gujarat (National Commission = NC)
Citation- Revision Petition No. 1674
of 2007

195,000 + 9% PA
+10,000

2

Tesol India, Chandigarh vs Sh. Govind Singh Patwal (Chandigarh State
Commission)

No info. about the
damages but awarded
exemplary cost of
5,000/- to complainant

3

Bhupesh Khurana vs Vishwa Buddha
Parishad 2000 CTJ 801 (CP)

Refund of college fees
+ 12% PA +20,000+
10,000 as cost

4

Brilliant Classes vs B.M. Gupta (NC)
Citation Revision Petition No. 281
of 2007

Fees + 2,500 as compensation

5

Indian Institute of Professional Studies vs Smt Rekha Sharma (NC)
Citation- Revision Petition No. 2864
of 2011

Fees + 10,000(mental
agony) + 2000 (litigation)+ 25,000(lost one
year)

6

C.M.S. Computer Institute vs Shri
Gaurva Sharma Appeal No. FA884/2006 (State Commission)

Fees + 5,000 as compensation

7

Smt. Divya Sood vs Ms. Gurdeep
Kaur Bhuhi
Citation: I (2007) Consumer
Protection Judgement

Fees refund + 25,000/as compensation by
District forum which
was confirmed by
State commission
but the NC observed
that the compensation
amount is very low.

8

Ajay Gautam vs Amritsar Eye Clinic
& Ors (NC)
Review Appl. No.79 of 2010 &
Review Appl No.209 of 2011

Compensation of
100,000 at 12% pa.

Time
Approx.
18 months

of the respondent, the overall effect of a misleading advertisement on society at large are
also to be taken into account.
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The (Abominable) Length of Proceedings
A more frequent critique of the Redressal Mechanism under the CPA
has been the length of proceedings.32 Instead of streamlining compensation
by rapid proceedings within the 90-150 day limit of Sec. 13 (3A) CPA,
this time frame is frequently exceeded. Particularly long delays happen if
the case is appealed which is possible to an almost unlimited and risk-free
extent under the working under Sec. 15 CPA (about 60 % of District Fora
orders). This generous appeal possibility seems to be responsible for the
backlog. The procedure before State Commissions takes on an average
about an additional 2 extra years, this being due to the fact that the State
Commissions are remarkably understaffed by comprising only a President
(a former High Court judge) and two members (without substitutes!) being
competent for all appeals in one state against District Fora orders. State
Commissions are, unlike courts, not divided into benches allowing a more
effective and speedy handling of cases. There is an incentive for parties to
go for appeal, in particular for the losing side (mostly businesses) in order
to avoid the order of the District Forum becoming final and being able to
be implemented.
Justice delayed is justice denied – a saying which is certainly true in
the Indian context. Other, more technical problems are also invoked, like
the understaffing of the District Fora or of the State Commissions, the
unwillingness of state authorities to speedily replace vacant positions, the
missing of adequate technical equipment. Several proposals have been
voiced in the Indian context to improve the working of the CPA mechanisms
- a discussion which will however not be taken up here.

The Overall Critique of the Compensation Mechanism of the CPA
by Patil
Prof. Patil, one of the most prominent Indian consumer law experts,
has summarized the critique against the compensatory mechanism of the
32 Report of the Working Group on Consumer Protection, Gov. of India, Dpt. of Consumer
Affairs, Twelfth Plan 2012-2017, at p. 28 referring to a total of 394.583 pending at
various levels, some of them more than 10 years.
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CPA – including its deficient socio-legal embeddedness as follows, after
having studied a bulk of cases:33
1. The provisions of the Consumer Protection Act 1986 are not efficient
and vigilant.
2. The Enforcement Machinery is not strong as there is need for not only
civil redressal but criminal provisions to be incorporated to make it
more efficient.
3. ….
4. When there is higher grievance then there should be provisions for
damages, compensation and penalization.
5. The consumer’s problems are created in the market-place and range
from fraud and deception to outright rejection of their just protest and
right to information about goods. Whatever the remedies which are
available in India for the protection of the consumers in the marketplace
they are by no means sufficient and the consumers find themselves
helpless due to ineffective legal machinery for redressal of grievances.
6. Very few consumers were fully aware about the rights, responsibilities
and the Consumer Protection Act. Hence, it is necessary to educate
them on their rights and responsibilities as consumers, to make them
vigilant, rational and aware buyers.
7. Educate consumers to develop an understanding about their
responsibilities as consumers. Consumers should organize together to
develop the strength and influence to promote and protect their own
interest. Government should make and implement rules of punishment
more harsh so that manufacturers and shopkeepers think twice before
adopting fraudulent practices.
8. Redress procedures should be made more logical, easy enough to be
understood by a large number of consumers. Further procedures shall
so designed as to have easy handling and quick disposal of cases.
33 Patil, Supra note 2 at p. 40.
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9. The active involvement and participation from all quarters i.e. the
Central and State Governments, the Educational Institutions, the NGOs,
the print and electronic media and the adoption and observance of a
voluntary code of conduct by the trade and industry and the Citizen’s
Charter by the service providers is necessary to see that the consumers
get their due.
This paper will however not go into the details of the Indian discussion,
except referring to the obvious deficiencies of the well-intended Indian
Consumer Redressal System, namely the lack of adequate compensation to
wronged consumers and the length of proceedings, especially when going
on appeal. This makes an effective preventive system ever more necessary
to which I will turn now under the existing CPA mechanism.
4.5. The Near-to-Absence of Preventive Justice under the CPA

As was already mentioned, the CPA is mostly concerned with individual
(or perhaps group) redressal schemes, not so much with preventive justice.
This has not been substantially changed after the 2002 amendments where
the jurisdiction of the MRTP-C was to some extent transferred to the CPA
institutions, without however giving them the same powers. In particular,
the narrow concept of UTP was not changed which always required a
prior transaction and did not apply in case of a complaint before a sale or
a service contract is concluded. This excludes jurisdiction particularly
against misleading advertising directed at a large public, as mentioned
before. The same is true with the corresponding concept of “consumer”
which is linked to a transaction against consideration, not to the objective
of the action (business or private).

Some examples supporting Preventive Justice in CPA
On the one hand, however, there are still some “hidden” elements in
the CPA provisions which could be used for preventive justice. This is
true with regard to available remedies which may have a deterrent effect
on wrongdoers in the consumer and advertising markets. There are no
23

statistics available on the (infrequent?) use of these remedies. The following
examples contain only anecdotal evidence:
Sec. 14 CPA: District Forum may issue “an order to the opposite party
directing him to (do) one or more of the following things, namely…:

34
35
36
37

•

Under lit. (f) this also includes an order “to discontinue the unfair
trade practice or the restrictive trade practice or not to repeat them”

•

This allows for corrective advertising, Sec. 14 (lit hc). In case Dr.
Navdeep Singh Khaira et al v Sheela Gupta et al,34 the National
Commission ordered “withdrawal of any such advertisement (on
wrongful laser treatment of an eye defect)…and to desist doing so
in future”.

•

Exemplary damages in case of repeated or serious infringements are
possible under the Sec. 14 (lit. d) CPA and in some cases awarded
by the State or National Commissions, see Bonn Nutrients vs Jagpa
Singh Dara.35 The damages may be put into a government (welfare)
fund and therefore not help consumers. However, the amount
awarded by the National Commission does not seem to have any
deterrent effect. The compensation awarded by the District Forum in
this case was 5000 Rs (60 €) and enhanced by the State Commission
to an exemplary award of Rs. 50.000 (about 600 €), plus Rs. 3000
for costs of the complaint.

•

A highly publicized case involving the award of punitive damages
before the National Commission Society of Catalysts v StarPlus
TV et al36 concerned the promise of prizes to be offered to the
participants of a lottery on a public TV programme which in fact
were financed by the very participants, allowing a substantial profit
to the advertiser without this being disclosed to the consumer.37

2010 (2) CPR 29 (NC).
2005 (2) CPR 111 (NC).
2008 (4) CPR 313 (NC).
For a similar scheme in the EU see ECJ judgment of 18.10.2012, case C-428/11 Purely
Creative: It is an unfair commercial practice under Dir. 2005/29/EU of informing the
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The scheme was regarded as a (grossly) UTP; the defendant
was condemned to “punitive damages” of 1 crore (120.000 €), a
remarkably high sum for Indian circumstances, even though only
covering 14 % of the profit from the scheme; the complaining
consumer association did not get anything excepta trifle 50.000 Rp.
(about 600 €) for its costs. This sum of 1 crorewas to be paid into
the “Consumer Welfare Fund”. At the end of the order, the NC said
that it “highly appreciate(d) the efforts made by complainant, the
Voluntary Consumer Association.” This is a remarkable example
of public interest litigation within the narrow framework of the
CPA. Whether the order which became final may have a substantial
preventive effect on the use of prizes for marketing purposes remains
to be seen.
•

Another way to speed up proceedings which is particularly important
for the success of preventive justice would be the use of interim
orders under Sec. 13 (3B) CPA as amended in 2002: These orders
seem also to be available for interlocutory injunctions to stop UTP
including misleading advertising before having caused damage to
consumers, but there seems to be little use so far by District Fora.

Limits to Preventive Justice under CPA
On the other hand, the proceedings before the Consumer Redressal
Institutions, in particular the District Fora, do not seem to be tailored to
preventive justice. They do not have the expertise to handle claims against
misleading advertising. They lack investigative powers. The exclusion of
trade associations from standing – unlike the MRTP-Act – necessarily
eliminates a number of potential complainants who have a substantial
interest and expertise how to successfully combat UTP. Injunctive relief,
particularly temporary injunctions seem to be available in theory but not
used in practice.
consumer that he has won a prize and obliging him, in order to receive that prize, to
incur a cost of whatever kind profiting the advertiser.
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The State Commissions would be in a better position to handle
preventive justice than the District Fora whose basic mission is to help the
“Indian consumer in need”.However, as I was told, the State Commissions
are remarkably understaffed by comprising only a President (a former High
Court judge) and two members (without substitutes!) being competent to
hear all appeals in one state against District Fora orders. State Commissions
are, unlike courts, not divided into benches allowing a more effective and
speedy handling of cases. They cannot take action against misleading
advertising suo motu, unlike the old MRTP-C. Vacancies of Presidents
and (the two) member of the Commissions are filled with great delay and
frequently subject to political squabbles.
How to Bring Preventive Justice against UTP again into
the Indian Legal Order – Some Personal Suggestions
and Recommendations

As a preliminary result of this study undertaken, the following changes
of law and practice of the CPA would be necessary as a minimum to improve
preventive justice on the Indian consumer market, thereby indirectly
profiting consumers themselves. This should be possible without radically
changing the entire institutional patterns and arrangements of the CPA:
1.

In order to improve the protection of the collective interest of Indian
consumers, there is a need for a paradigm extension in Indian consumer
law and practice under the CPA. Such extension would imply action
under the CPA from compensation only to both compensation and
prevention. This conforms to a citation by a prominent Indian author
Singh:38 “(the) purpose (of the CPA)…is to outlaw practices which
are deceptive and otherwise unfair to consumers”.

2.

This paradigm extension implies both legislative and institutional
changes, but in no way radical modifications of the existing structure
and practice under the CPA. This paper will list only some of them,
without being in any way exhaustive. The recommendations are purely
personal and in no way binding on GIZ.

38 Consumer Protection Law, 2005, p. 158.
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3.

As a first requirement, preventive jurisdiction against UTP, in
particular misleading advertising should lie exclusively with the State
Commissions, eventually the National Commission, not with District
Fora. It is suggested that a second bench be installed in the – at
present overburdened and understaffed - State Commissions which
would handle preventive actions with a view to developing expertise
and efficiency – similar to the existing (5) benches at the National
Commission.39 Such centralization and concentration of proceedings
would accelerate the complaint handling which in the end would be
monitored by the possibility of an appeal to the Supreme Court of
India.

4.

As a second important reform to be enacted by the Indian legislator,
there is a need to modify existing legal restrictions to improve
prevention, in particular by broadening the jurisdiction under Sec.
12 to cover practices also before any commercial transaction with a
consumer has taken place, similar to Sec. 36A MRTP Act of 1984,40
Art. 3(1) EU Dir. 2005/29. The concept of consumer needs to be
widened to include cases where there has been no express transaction
for consideration, but its preparation.

5.

The remedial mechanism should be improved with a view to attain
rapid cessation orders against obvious UTP, including interlocutory/
interim injunctions to be sought by “recognized consumer
associations” under Sec. 12 (b), consumer groups under Sec. 12 (c)
and/or governments under Sec. 12 (d) CPA. Individual consumers
should not have standing.

6.

Whether trade associations should have standing like under EU law
and the former MRTP-Act must be decided by the legislator. This
author is convinced that a broadening of standing to include also
business actors would increase the preventive effect of the CPA, but
be strictly limited to preventive, not to compensatory jurisdiction.

39 Report of the working group, Supra note 32 at p. 21.
40 See of the Mittal report p. 45.
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7.

In order to allow a speedy out of court settlement of a case concerning
an UTP, an informal pre-trial “warning procedure” would be helpful
as used in many EU countries. It could be initiated by consumer
organizations, consumer groups and governments having standing
under Sec. 12 CPA, eventually also by trade associations. If the trader/
advertiser complies, he would sign an undertaking to abstain from
continuing the UTP, sanctioned by a conditional penalty in case of
breach.

8.

It is suggested that the already existing remedies under Sec. 11 (2)
CPA, including accelerated procedures for orders with “interim
effect”, could be activated to allow for rapid injunctive relief.

9.

Orders by State Commissions or the National Commission enjoining
a specific UTP should be accompanied by a conditional penalty
payment in case of breach. If the order has been appealed, the penalty
payment would only be preliminary and has to be revoked in case of
a successful appeal by trader.

10. Under existing law, neither the State Commissions nor the National
Commission has investigative powers, unlike the former MRTPCommission. In the opinion of this author, this principle should not
be abandoned because of the judicial character of the Commissions.
It would therefore be part of the substantiation requirements of an
action for an injunction by the plaintiffs as mentioned under paras 5/6,
to submit the necessary documentation to the Commission to justify
a claim. If consumer associations do not have the means to provide
the necessary documentation, this must be done by the state plaintiff
under Sec. 12 (d) CPA. The defendant advertiser could obviously
rebut the claim by appropriate counter-evidence. The Commission
could use its own expertise and knowledge of the deceptiveness of
an adverting, or, as the case may be, consult an independent expert
to assess the claims.41 It could however not take action proprio motu.
41 See Patil, Consumer Protection Amendment Bill 2011 – An Analysis, in Patil (ed.), 25
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11. The existing remedy of corrective advertising should be used more
frequently by State Commissions and the National Commission in
advertising cases. Serious violations may be sanctioned by exemplary,
as is already done today, however exceptionally.
12. Punitive damages which were introduced by the 2002 amendments42
need to be utilized more frequently in the public interest against UTP
seriously impairing the consumer interest.43
13. The Undersigned does not take a stand on recommending or not the
establishment of a Consumer Protection Agency to deliver preventive
justice similar to the defunct MRTP-C, which has been recommended
by the GFA-study44 and more cautiously proposed as Option 1 of the
CUTS-study.45 The Government working group has discussed the
establishment of a “National Trade Practices Regulatory Authority”,
but has not taken any recommendation on this controversial issue.46
14. The proposed “paradigm extension” of the CPA should not undermine
the traditional consumer protection role of its institutional structure, in
particular by the jurisdiction of the District Fora for compensation and/
or restitution which should remain untouched, but be supplemented
by elements of a better preventive control in order to avoid consumer
harm before a contract is entered into. Some legislative changes as
indicated above will be necessary for this objective. On the other hand,
the existing CPA already contains elements to protect the collective
consumer interest, in particular in its provisions on standing (to be

42
43
44
45

46

Years of Consumer Protection Act – Challenges and the New Way Forward, 2012, at
p. 115.
Singh, Supra note 31 at p. 196.
Report of the working group, Supra note 33 at p. 20.
GFA/GIZ Study by Chaturvedi and Thorun of 2 May 2012 on “Recommendation for
a National Consumer Protection Agency”.
CUTS Report on “Study and analyse the situation in India regarding unfair trade practices
and limitations of enforcement”, 2013 at pp. 66; option 2 proposed “strengthening
the institutions under the CPA” and comes close to the recommendations voiced in this
paper.
Supra note 33 at p.23.
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extended to trade associations), compensation (exemplary and/or
punitive) with deterrent effect, and remedies for injunctive relief.
15. The recommendations of this study can be regarded only as a “second
best” compared to a solution based on a public authority like the
former MRTP-Commission. Under the CPA, the redressal institutions
do not have investigative powers, nor can they initiate proceedings
propriomotu. The injunctive remedies do not seen to be sufficienteven if improved in the CPA as suggested - in the absence of public
enforcement.
Conclusion – The Necessity of a Joint Reading of
Prevention and Compensation Against UTP in a “Movable
System of Consumer Law”

How far does the Indian system of regulating UTP conform to Hans
Micklitz ideas of a “movable system”? It may be useful to take a look at
another paper of Hans Micklitz’ work where he criticizes the so-called
“Kästchendenken” (“thinking in legal boxes”) in unfair commercial
practices regulation.47 Under such a (wrong!) premise, trade regulation
and prohibition of unfair contract terms are two completely separate areas
which have nothing to do with each other. This narrow view – popular
especially in German legal thinking - has found some confirmation in the
above mentioned Art. 3 (2) of the UCPD, even though critique had already
been voiced by authors from other jurisdictions48.
Hans Micklitz’ broader view was to some extent supported by a recent
litigation before the ECJ in case C-453/10 Pereničova and Perenić. The
Advocate General Trstenjak in her opinion of 21.11.2011 wrote:
“….An overall examination of the legal acts adopted to protect the
consumer reveals many links between them, which must similarly be taken
47 M i c k l i t z / R e i c h , A B G - R e c h t u n d U W G – ( e n d l i c h ) e i n e E n d e d e s
KästchendenkensnachPerecinova und Invitel? EWS 2012, 257-264; it should be admitted
the the relevant parts of this paper orignated from the pen of Hans!
48 See for example Orlando, The Use of Unfair Contractual Terms as an Unfair Commercial
Practice, ERCL 2011, 25.
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into account in the interpretation. The acts of European Union Law in the
area of Consumer Protection Law must therefore be seen as part of a single,
overall set of rules which complement each other” (para 86).
The Court in its judgment of 15.3.2012 has taken up this broader
approach toward a joint understanding and interpretation of the UCPD
and UTD:
“In those circumstances, … a finding that a commercial practice is
unfair is one element among others on which the competent court may base
its assessment of the unfairness of contractual terms under Article 4(1) of
Directive 93/13” (para 43).
Such “joint reading” of instruments of trade practices and mandatory
contract law insists on their common consumer protective objective and
should be making its way into EU and implementing Member State law.
As this paper on India hopefully shows, this integrated understanding
between UTP and individual remedies has some tradition there which is
useful to be considered also by the EU lawyer. The problem of modern
Indian consumer law seems to be concerned with the reverse problem as
in the EU discussion taken up by Hans Micklitz: the predominant focus on
individual compensation against UTP has seemingly left behind the need
for preventive justice. Indian law still has to develop efficient remedies
before UTP appear on the market place and harm consumers. Individual
and Collective Remedies, Compensation and Prevention have to be seen
as two sides of the coin of an efficient consumer protection practice as
being directed toward both, without artificially putting them into “different
legal boxes”. Indian and EU law share the same orientation but suffer
from one-sided deficits relating either to prevention or compensation, if
my observations on the relevant state of each law is correct. The “movable
system” as proposed by Hans Micklitz should be able to overcome these
deficits.
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